India's Politics: Corruption

Rajni Kothari ("Politics in India", 1970) on corruption:

"An elaborate network of patronage has developed, extending deep into the countryside. Much of this is controlled and directed from levels lower than the state. Availability of new kinds of jobs, distribution of loans and benefits, control of institutions dealing with credit and scarce materials, establishment of new positions of prestige and authority, the penetration of educational institutions and voluntary organisations with new resources, and above all a known and intelligible pattern of influence and corruption – all these have brought life and significance to the governmental machine, endowed it with political meaning, and led to an increasing communication between traditional society and the new structure of institutions."

India's Politics: The Urban Middle Class

Rajni Kothari ("Politics in India", 1970) on how the urban middle class lost power to the rural zamindars:

"Different stages in the social organisation of politics call for somewhat different leadership and organisational skills, and the movement from one stage to another may displace one kind of leadership by another. Consequently, one social group endowed with one type of social skills may be displaced by another endowed with another type of skills.

Thus in the early stage of intellectual awakening and urban-style political organisation, the need was for people able to deal with Western and Westernised administrators, well-versed in fine points of debate and ideological disputation, possessing legal acumen, and capable of founding and sustaining small associations of public-minded persons that would agitate for specific causes. Such men were mainly provided by the Brahminic and traditional administrative classes who not only took to the new education but had also been endowed by a long tradition of scholastic knowledge and formal brilliance.

With the movement into a more diversified and mass-oriented politics, however, not only was there a need for a wider base of support articulation but also for new types of managerial and organisational skills. With this shift in orientation, the Brahminic and administrative castes began to be outnumbered by men from commercial and peasant proprietor occupations, occupations that had always called for a high level of interpersonal skills, a pragmatic and bargaining approach to problems, and an ability to marshal a new type of solidarity among their own castes, often based on a reinterpretation of their traditional status and a populist and anti-elitist ideology. These were the new entrepreneurs, the new innovators, of politics. They were less modern than the elites they replaced, less educated and more rural-based, operated through an idiom that was decidedly more traditional.

There has taken place a growing politicisation of the traditional sub-centres of Indian society. The rural elites have seized the organisation of these sub-centres and have on the basis of a new consolidation – caste federations, cooperative societies, panchayati raj – pushed themselves upward to state and national levels. Utilising the opportunities of cooptation offered by the metropolitan elite, they have occupied crucial positions at higher levels and have generally succeeded in outnumbering and outwitting the modernists."

India's Politicians: The Rural Zamindars

Rajni Kothari ("Politics in India", 1970) on politicians – the rural zamindars:

"In order to make itself secure in office, the ruling groups in the states have increasingly relied on the rural vote, spreading its patronage far and wide controlling local authorities, educational institutions and other developmental agencies, including important voluntary organisations. Concomitantly, institutional power shifted downward and a different set of men emerged who took charge of these networks, captured positions in the party organisation, and slowly acquired considerable strength and power.

The new organisation men that emerged are to be found away from the urban centres of state power in small towns and district capitals, closer to the traditional order, and exhibiting a new style in Indian politics. They are pragmatic men, less oriented to the modernist idiom but modernisers in their own way, men who understand the subtleties and nuances of local society, powerful persons who have taken time in coming up, and who are therefore confident of their own strength. When elections come, the state leaders have to rely increasingly upon these men who happen both to occupy positions of influence in the institutions of planned change and to be in close communication with socially entrenched and economically powerful local elites. Some of them are popular leaders, others ruthless managers, but they control the vote.

Generally coming from the well-to-do class of peasant proprietors, they are men of some means, skilled in the art of managing men and running institutions, and very knowledgeable concerning local conditions.

They have to establish a rapport with the local bullies (muscle) who can intimidate and cajole the people, who normally keep faith, and who in their crude way maintain peace in the locality."

India's Politics: Caste

Rajni Kothari ("Politics in India", 1970) on caste:

"Everyone recognises that the social system in India is organised around caste structures and caste identities. In dealing with the relationship between caste and politics, however, the tendency is to start at the wrong end of the question: Is caste disappearing? In part such an approach comes from a widely held dichotomy between traditional and modern forms of organisation. In reality, however, no social system disappears. A more useful point of departure would be: What form is caste taking under the impact of politics, and what form is politics taking in a caste-oriented society?

Those who complain of 'casteism in politics' in India are really looking for a sort of politics that has no basis in society. They also probably lack any clear conception of either the nature of politics or the nature of the caste system. (Some of them would want to throw out both politics and the caste system) The process of politics is one of identifying and manipulating existing structures in order to mobilise support and consolidate positions. Where the caste structure provides one of the most important organisational clusters in which the population is found to live, politics must strive to organise through such a structure."

"Politics in India": Rajni Kothari

Rajni Kothari's "Politics in India" (1970) is a systematic study of Indian politics.

Contents:

A. Introduction
1. Theoretical background
2. Historical background
3. Political background

B. The Political System
4. Development of the system
5. Political parties

C. The System's Environment
6. Indian/Hindu society
7. Indian/Hindu culture

D. The System's Performance
8. Political performance
9. Economic performance
10. Foreign affairs
11. Future trends

India: Ordinary Men Vs Great Men (Society/Family)

A brilliant psychological analysis* of how the Indian society/family is designed to produce a mass of ordinary men and only a very few great men (like Swami Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi):

"Almost all students of Indian personality have been struck by the extreme indulgence of the Indian child, principally by the mother but also by other members of the family. This gives rise to a sense of omnipotence in the infant, a feeling that is fortified by nursing practices and physical proximity with the mother for an extended period of time.

An important consequence of this is that there develops in the Indian child a strong individual ego. As a result, moral energy does not come from the pressure of guilt feelings arising from a failure to live up to the social ideal, but depends crucially on a self-cultivated individual ideal. Fulfillment of the ideals set for the individual – rather than social obligation – becomes the main drive for moral action.

This creates wide gaps in individual capacities. For the average Indian, as morality has reference to self-directed and introspective perfection, the compulsion to perform is not very great. On the other hand, the culture develops high and universalist ideals with which the creative and power-motivated individuals strongly identify: the theme that the individual itself is the Absolute drives them to ever higher levels of perfection.

This gulf between the drives of ordinary men and those of great men results in abstract concepts of duty and morality, and a personality ideal that is high and remote – realisable only by exceptional men whose authority derives from their capacity to embody virtues that are lacking in ordinary men. Hence the exaggerated role of the guru, the ascetic, the warrior, and indirectly of a hierarchy of roles, and charisma."

*Politics in India – Rajni Kothari (1970)

See Nietzsche's "Superman" Theory

India: Ancient Vs Medieval - Traditional Vs Feudal Politico-Economic Systems

A comparison of the politico-economic systems of ancient and medieval India (traditional vs feudal):

	Traditional (Ancient)	Feudal (Medieval)
		.
1. Nationality of the rulers	Indian	Foreign (Turk, Mughal, British)
		.
2. Objective of the system	Welfare of the people	Welfare of the rulers
		.
3. Basis of the system	Consent	Force
		.
4. Political nature	Freedom	Slavery
		.
5. Economic objective	Creating wealth	Looting wealth
		.
6. Religious agenda	Tolerance	Conversion
		.
7. Legal basis	Dharma (rule of law)	Nil (law of the jungle: might is right)

Materialism, Spirituality and Idealism in India

What is the purpose of life? All human goals can be classified into 4 groups:
1. Kama (desire, pleasure)
2. Artha (wealth, power)
3. Dharma (morality, duty)
4. Moksha (salvation)

Accordingly we have the 3 philosophies of life:
A. Materialism – The pursuit of Kama and Artha
B. Idealism – The pursuit of Dharma
C. Spirituality – The pursuit of Moksha

Materialism does not give us happiness. Worse, it breeds selfishness, dishonesty and corruption – leading to the downfall of the society/nation. Example: Roman Empire.

Spirituality is offered as an alternative to materialism. But spirituality is an other-worldly philosophy. It rejects life in this world. By neglecting society, it also leads to the downfall of a nation. Example: India around 1000 AD.

So what is the solution? Lost between the two extremes of materialism and spirituality is the true answer: idealism – the pursuit of Dharma. If people live by certain simple rules (ie, morality) and do their duty sincerely, it brings both individual happiness and social well-being.

For 4000 years India gave primacy to Dharma – and was the world's richest and most powerful civilisation. Then, for some reason, we started giving primacy to Moksha. The result was we were conquered and ruled by foreigners (Turks, Mughals, British) for 1000 years.

In 1947 AD (Kali Yuga 5049) we finally became free. It was a golden opportunity to restore Dharma as the foundation of our nation. Instead, we confused Dharma with religion and threw it into the dustbin (because we are "secular"). The vacuum was filled by materialism. The results are there for all to see today.

The time has come to rescue India from both materialism and spirituality, and restore idealism (Dharma) as our national philosophy.

See:

1. What is Dharma? – 1

2. What is Dharma? – 2

The Most Important People in Society

The most important people in society are:
1. Farmers
2. Teachers
3. Soldiers
But they are given the least importance.

The most useless people in society are:
1. Movie stars
2. Cricket players
3. Politicians
But they are given the most importance.

Classification of World Religions

Classification of world religions:

A. Indian (Hindu/Aryan)
1. Shaivism
2. Vaishnavism
3. Shaktism
4. Buddhism
5. Jainism
6. Sikhism

B. East Asian (Sinic)
1. Confucianism
2. Taoism
3. Shintoism

C. West Asian (Semitic)
1. Judaism
2. Christianity
3. Islam

When Did World War 2 Start?

Q: When Did World War 2 Start?
A: 1939

WRONG! World War 2 began in 1937, when Japan invaded China on 7 July 1937.

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland – starting the Second World War in Europe. But the war itself had already begun.

Western historians say World War 2 began in 1939, not 1937. This only shows their Western bias and Euro-centric view of the world. There is no need for us to parrot this lie.

Today is the 75th anniversary of the beginning of the most destructive war in history.

India's Caste/Varna System: An Economic System

The four inputs (factors) of production are land, labour, capital and knowledge. Efficiency can be achieved by specialisation. In ancient India, different social groups (Varnas) specialised in handling the different factors of production:

Varna	Factor of Production
Brahmana	Knowledge
Kshatriya	Land
Vaishya	Capital
Shudra	Labour

Thus the Varna/caste system was born, based on economic specialisation.

See The Origin of the Varna/Caste System.

"IF" - Rudyard Kipling: Kannada Translation

My crude Kannada translation of Rudyard Kipling's "IF" (1895):

ಧೀರ
ಜನ ತಲೆ ಕೆಟ್ಟು ನಿನಗೆ ಶಾಪ ಹಾಕಿದಾಗ,
ನೀನು ಶಾಂತವಾಗಿರು.
ಯಾರೂ ನಿನ್ನನ್ನು ನಂಬದಿದ್ದಾಗ ನಿನ್ನನ್ನು ನೀನು ನಂಬು,
ಆದರೆ ಅವರ ಸಂದೇಹವನ್ನೂ ಗೌರವಿಸು.
ಜೀವನದಲ್ಲಿ ಕಾಯುವುದು ಅನಿವಾರ್ಯ;
ಕಾಯುವುದರಿಂದ ಸುಸ್ತಾಗದಿರು.
ನಿನ್ನ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಜನ ಸುಳ್ಳು ಹೇಳಿದಾಗ, ನೀನು ಸುಳ್ಳು ಹೇಳದಿರು.
ನಿನ್ನನ್ನು ಜನ ದ್ವೇಷಿಸಿದಾಗ, ನೀನು ದ್ವೇಷಿಸದಿರು.
ಆದರೂ ಸಂತನ ಹಾಗೆ ಕಾಣದಿರು, ಋಷಿಯ ಹಾಗೆ ನುಡಿಯದಿರು.
ನೀನು ಧೀರ, ಮರೆಯದಿರು.

ಕನಸು ಕಾಣು - ಆದರೆ ಕನಸುಗಳು ನಿನ್ನ ಮಾಲೀಕ ಆಗದಿರಲಿ.
ಚಿಂತನೆ ಮಾಡು - ಆದರೆ ಚಿಂತನೆಗಳು ನಿನ್ನ ಗುರಿ ಆಗದಿರಲಿ.
ಗೆಲುವು-ಸೋಲುಗಳನ್ನು ಎದುರಿಸಿ,
ಆ ಎರಡು ವಂಚಕರನ್ನು ಸಮವಾಗಿ ನೋಡು.
ನೀನು ಹೇಳಿದ ಸತ್ಯವನ್ನು ನೀಚರು ತಿರುಚಿಸಿ
ಮೂರ್ಖರಿಗೆ ಬಲೆ ಹೆಣೆದರೆ ಹೆಣೆಯಲಿ.
ನೀನು ಜೀವನ ಕೊಟ್ಟ ಕಾರ್ಯ ನಾಶವಾದಾಗ,
ಬಗ್ಗಿ ಸವೆದು ಹೋದ ಯಂತ್ರಗಳಿಂದ ಅದನ್ನು ಮತ್ತೆ ಕಟ್ಟಿಸು.
ನೀನು ಧೀರ, ಮರೆಯದಿರು.

ಜೀವನದ ಜೂಜಾಟದಲ್ಲಿ ನೀನು ಗೆದ್ದಿದ್ದನ್ನು ಎಲ್ಲ ರಾಶಿ ಮಾಡಿ,
ಅದನ್ನು ನಾಣ್ಯದ ಒಂದು ಎಸೆತದ ಮೇಲೆ ಜೂಜಿಡು.
ಸೋತರೆ ಮತ್ತೆ ಮೊದಲಿನಿಂದ ಆಟ ಶುರು ಮಾಡು;
ಯಾರಿಗೂ ನಿನ್ನ ನಷ್ಟದ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಹೇಳದಿರು.
ಎದೆ-ನರ-ಸ್ನಾಯುಗಳು ಕಿತ್ತು ಹೋದರೂ ಹೋರಾಟ ಮಾಡು
ನಿನ್ನಲ್ಲಿ "ಮುನ್ನಡೆ!" ಎನ್ನುವ ಮನಸ್ಸು ಒಂದೇ ಉಳಿದಾಗ
ನೀನು ಮುನ್ನಡೆ!
ನೀನು ಧೀರ, ಮರೆಯದಿರು.

ಬಡವರ ಜತೆ ನುಡಿ - ಆದರೆ ಶ್ರೇಷ್ಠನಾಗಿರು.
ಒಡೆಯರ ಜತೆ ನಡೆ - ಆದರೆ ಸಾಮಾನ್ಯನಾಗಿರು.
ಶತ್ರುಗಳು ಮಿತ್ರರು ಯಾರೂ ನಿನ್ನನ್ನು ದುಃಖಿಸಬಲ್ಲರು.
ಎಲ್ಲರನ್ನು ಪ್ರೀತಿಸು, ಯಾರನ್ನೂ ಮೋಹಿಸಬೇಡ.
ನಿರ್ದಯ ದಿನವನ್ನು 24 ಗಂಟೆಗಳ ಕೆಲಸದಿಂದ ತುಂಬಿಸು.
ಈ ಭೂಮಿ ನಿನ್ನದು, ಈ ಭೂಮಿಯ ಸಂಪತ್ತು ನಿನ್ನದು.
ನೀನು ಧೀರ, ಮರೆಯದಿರು.

Dipankar Gupta: "Mistaken Modernity - India Between Worlds"

Dipankar Gupta was professor of sociology at JNU. A review of his "Mistaken Modernity: India Between Worlds" (2000):

Modernity

"Modernity has to do with attitudes, especially those that come into play in social relations. A modern society is one in which at least the following characteristics must be present:
- Dignity of the individual
- Adherence to universalistic norms
- Elevation of individual achievement over privileges of birth
- Accountability in public life."

This is a very narrow and selective definition of modernity. Modernity refers to the totality of the technology, economy, society, politics and culture that came into being after the Industrial Revolution. See Modernity: Technology, Economy, Society, Politics.

Modernisation

"Once these attributes are in place, it does not really matter if there is high-level technology. Generally speaking, technology (is a) consequence of the four characteristics of modernisation listed above, and (does not by itself) constitute modernity."

This is complete nonsense. The above characteristics are the features of an industrial society – which was the product of the Industrial Revolution. See The Techno-Economic Basis of Society.

India Today

"An analysis of contemporary India will reveal that while there has been a definite move from tradition, what we see around us is not yet modern. If the clock were to stop here, the final diagnosis should declare India as still unmodern."

Of course India is not yet modern. India began modernising properly only from 1991 onwards. See India's Modernisation. Today India can be said to be only 50% modern. See my Index of Modernisation. By the way, this delay in India's modernisation was due to Nehru's socialism – which Prof Gupta also believes in (see below).

Economics

"In this era (of globalisation), trade unions have been laid low and, along with it, the emphasis on production and producers as the main planks of economic thought and policy making. In their place, the consumer has stepped in and has become pivotal in all calculations.
Thus in the age when production was central, technologies entered only if they first cleared national barriers regarding what will be produced. Today, consumers get the first preference and any obstruction, in getting these goods and services across to them is anathema to the ideology of globalisation. In the age of globalisation, the consumer is king while the producer has been put out to pasture.
In other words, economic policies today tend to centre on what consumers want. It is no longer material if this brings about unemployment, greater economic dependency or lack of trade union privileges. These issues mattered a great deal in the age of internationalisation, which was production-centric."

Production and consumption are two sides of the same coin, two halves of the same process. How can there be any production without consumption? What is the use of producing goods for which there is no demand? Prof Gupta should stick to sociology, and leave economics alone (but then, he has gotten his sociology also wrong). To talk about production vs consumption is meaningless. His real argument here is socialism vs capitalism.

Socialism

"(Before globalisation,) national well-being and economic sovereignty were critical issues then that could not be ignored; indeed, these had to be kept up front in any policy formulation. This approach quite logically favoured planned and centralised development in which workers' rights, wages, wage goods and production conditions were critical considerations. Therefore, if the long-term interest of the nation meant that cars of a certain kind, or colour televisions, would not be produced because that might jeopardise a country's economic self-reliance, then that was that.
Economic restrictions and trade policies that earlier determined what will be produced, and how, are now looked at with distaste."

Here Prof Gupta openly makes the case for socialism. These are exactly the policies that kept India poor for 40 years – and delayed India's modernisation (an issue he is so worked up over).

Tradition

"The encumbrances of tradition permanently debased large numbers of people who were locked in an unyielding social hierarchy. There was no such thing as a universal law in traditional India, leaving subjects completely at the whim of their superiors. People suffered untold misery because of the accident of their birth.
Anyone who has seen how tradition has shackled the poor, or how it has tormented Hindu widows, will not have the slightest hesitation in welcoming modernity with all its stated drawbacks."

Tradition is the way of life of agricultural society, and modernity is the way of life of industrial society. Agricultural society was an unequal society all over the world – not just in India. Even Western society was like this before the Industrial Revolution.

Feudalism

"Much of the recent spate of murders and mayhem is only a bold reassertion of traditional Indian culture. Women and underlings must always be subservient, or else. Those wielding positions of power are not accountable to anyone. Children, especially boys, are supposed to run amok all their lives, more so if they come from privileged homes.
To hold modernity responsible for the grisly incidents of urban violence perpetrated by political brats, or to blame westernisation for the molestation of women in hotel discotheques, only corroborates what we Indians hate to admit: that our traditional culture is deeply flawed at its core."

These perversions are not "tradition", but feudalism – which was the product of 1000 years of Islamic and British rule. See India: Ancient, Medieval, Modern Periods. It is not Hindu tradition that is "deeply flawed at its core", but Islamic+British feudalism – which sadly still survives in India today.

It is Prof Gupta who is mistaken about modernity (and many other things), not India.

Industrialisation/Modernisation: Definition

What is industrialisation/modernisation? What is its definition?

Industrialisation/modernisation = Increasing output by using technology (in agriculture, industry and services – in that order).

This is the core/heart/essence of industrialisation or modernisation.

From the Encyclopedia Britannica ("Economic Development"):

"A broader view of industrialisation is more relevant to economic development. In this sense, industrialisation is the application of modern science, technology and management to the task of raising the productivity of resources – not only in the manufacturing sector but in the economy as a whole, including the agricultural sector."

India's Development and the Five-Year Plans

Development economics tells us that the keys to a country's development are:
1. Agriculture
2. Education
3. Healthcare
4. Infrastructure

How has India fared in these four areas (in terms of inputs) since 1947? Let us look at the resource allocation for different sectors in our Five-Year Plans:

	Resource Allocation (%)
Plan	Agriculture	Industry	Infrastructure	Social Services
1. 1951–56	37	5	34	24
2. 1956–61	21	24	37	18
3. 1961–66	21	23	40	17
A. 1966–69	24	25	36	15
4. 1969–74	24	20	38	19
5. 1974–79	22	24	36	17
6. 1980–85	24	15	44	16
7. 1985–90	22	13	45	16
8. 1992–97	22	11	46	18
9. 1997–02	21	5	48	21
10. 2002–07	20	4	43	27
11. 2007–12	19	4	41	30

a) "Agriculture" = Agriculture + Irrigation. From the Seventh Plan onward, it includes Rural Development also.

b) "Infrastructure" = Energy + Transport and Communications.

c) "Social Services" = Education + Healthcare + other services. Separate figures for Education and Healthcare are available only till the Sixth Plan. Till the Sixth Plan, allocations for Education and Healthcare averaged around 6% and 4% respectively – together about 50% of "Social Services".

d) Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding off. Also, the Seventh and later Plans have some minor sectors, which I have left out.

• Agriculture and Industry were given equal importance till 1974-79. They received an average of 22% and 23% respectively of the total allocation (from 1956-61 to 1974-79). But we should have given more importance to Agriculture – like the East Asian countries.

• Infrastructure was not neglected, contrary to popular opinion. It received the largest share of resources (average 40%). Then why is our infrastructure so poor?

• Education and Healthcare were neglected – getting only around 6% and 4% respectively. This was our biggest mistake. Only in the last two Plans (2002-07 and 2007-12) did we allocate more resources for them – presumably around 9% and 6% respectively.

• Finally, Industry was given importance till 1974-79: average 23%. This decreased with the "limited liberalisation" of the 1980s (1980-85 and 1985-90): average 14%. It decreased even more after the 1991 reforms (1997-2002 onwards): average 4%, with industry being left to the private sector.

In sum, our report card on the four key areas (on the input side) is:
1. Agriculture – Average
2. Education – Poor
3. Healthcare – Poor
4. Infrastructure – Good

Data from Indian Economy (2010) by S K Misra and V K Puri.

D D Kosambi: An Introduction to the Study of Indian History

D D Kosambi (1907–1966) did his BA at Harvard University. His "An Introduction to the Study of Indian History" (1957) was the first Marxist history of India. Sham Lal, then assistant editor of The Times of India, reviewed the book. Some excerpts from the review(1):

Vishnu and Shiva

"New god developed, better suited to the rustic mentality, and more paying to the Brahmins" he writes. "The most successful was Vishnu-Narayana-Krishna, who dominates the final rendition of the Mahabharata, which is closely related to the Manu Smriti." But as it happens, the Krishna of the Mahabharata is as far from being a rustic god as one can imagine. He is a warrior and thinker of the first order. Or does Kosambi think it is too homespun for those who live in big cities, or for the semi-literate Khrushchevs and Eisenhowers who run advanced industrial societies today?

"The ancestry of the new gods – Shiva and Vishnu – is no longer relevant" he says. The trouble starts when the two new worships come into violent conflict. "The reason was" snaps the professor's explanation "that Shiva had by then become the god the great barons, whereas the cowherd-boy Krishna remained associated with small producers." Was the South full of barons and the North of small producers? And did the later worship of Hari-Hara or Vishnu and Shiva as one god mean that the barons and small producers had become one class?

Bhagavad Gita

In regard to the syncretism achieved by the Bhagavad Gita over 2000 years ago, Kosambi says "it is still powerful in forming the consciousness of upper class Hindus by furnishing the ideological spheres where they fight out their conflicts." How does he hope to get away with so daft a generalisation? What about its part in forming the consciousness the lower classes? How has the superstructure(2) managed to remain intact over the centuries while the base(2) has changed out of recognition? Or does Kosambi mean to say that the base hasn't changed? Or that even if it has, the ideological needs of the upper classes have remained the same under pre-feudal as well as capitalist systems? In any case, how does the philosophical reconciliation of Yoga and Sankhya or Jnana and Bhakti help to provide weapons in the fight against new taxation and new bureaucratic controls?

Gupta Empire: Golden Age of India

Who spoke of the Golden Age of the Guptas? Not Kosambi. It is true, he tells us, that we have more gold coins from the Gupta period than from any other, but gold coins don't make an age golden. What about Kalidasa? We mumble. And Aryabhata and Varahamihira? And those who painted the murals in caves 1 and 2 and 16 and 17 at Ajanta, and carved the face of the Sarnath Buddha? Kosambi dismisses these questions with a shrug of the shoulder. "I know all that and much more" he says in effect. "But bejewelled Avalokiteshvaras and faintly smiling Buddhas don't make an age golden either. Look at the languishing cities, a more hidebound caste system, and the idiocy of life in the stagnating villages." We are not convinced. There must be something more to it than the idiocy of village life. How could so much idiocy sustain so much sophistication in both art and thought?

Buddhism

Kosambi dismisses the earlier split in Buddhism without much ado. It is true, as he says, that the Mahayana school "changed its language to Sanskrit" and the Mahayanists "drifted away further from the common people in their refinement of doctrine, researches into science, and higher abstract philosophy." But to concede this is not to say that the Hinayana school was more popular. Indeed the very raison d'etre of the Mahayana school was its greater appeal to the mass of the people. Its elaborate mythology was a concession to popular taste, and the thousands for whom the austere Hinayana doctrine had no attraction fell for the new creed.

Mythology

While referring to the priestly myths, he says that "these fables and a certain rigid discipline were helpful to impose upon savages, to initiate a class society." These fables were a part either of the superstructure of a pre-class society or of a class society. If they were the product of a pre-class society, they could hardly be expected to serve the needs of a class society. If they were them selves the product of a class society, how could they help to initiate it?

Religion

He says that the Indus Valley cities rested upon trade, not fighting. This naturally raises the question: If the army or police was not very strong, what helped the trader to maintain his unequal sharing of profit? Kosambi thinks the answer is religion. But this is really no answer, for it evades the real question as to why religion became such a force here and not elsewhere. Kosambi says "dominance of religion would explain the changelessness of the culture over at least 500 and more, probably 1500 years." But the real question is: What explains the dominance of religion in the first place?

Culture and Philosophy

Kosambi ties himself in an impossible knot when he asserts that "the subtle mystic philosophies, tortuous religions, ornate literature, monuments teeming with intricate sculpture and delicate music of India all derive from the same historical process that produced the famished apathy of the villager, the senseless opportunism and termite greed of the cultured strata, sullen uncoordinated discontent among the workers, the general demoralisation, misery, squalor and degrading superstition. The one is the result of the other; the one is the expression of the other."

Yet, this is precisely what he fails to prove. How do we explain the sheer beauty and depth of the music? Is it the result of the "termite greed of the cultured strata"? Or is it the expression of the "sullen discontent" of the subalterns? Are the mystic philosophies the result of "greed", or do they try to do away with this evil – at least in those who really believe in them? It does not help to explain a part of the superstructure as a result of economic causes, and the rest as a reflection of economic conditions. It only makes the confusion worse confounded.


Notes:
1. Indian Realities in Bits and Pieces (2003)
2. See Karl Marx's base-superstructure theory

Shibumi: Age of the Warrior Vs Age of the Merchant

The contrast between the Age of the Warrior and the Age of the Merchant is one of the themes in Trevanian's 1979 thriller "Shibumi". Some quotes:

General Kishikawa: "All wars are lost ultimately. By both sides, Nikko. The day of battles between professional warriors is gone. Now we have wars between opposing industrial capacities, opposing populations. The Russians, with their sea of faceless people, will defeat the Germans. The Americans, with their anonymous factories, will defeat us (Japanese). Ultimately."

General Kishikawa: "They (Americans) are very skilfull merchants, and they have a great respect for fiscal achievement. These may seem thin and tawdry virtues to you, but they are consonant with the patterns of the industrial world. At best, they are a mannered technology. In place of ethics, they have rules. Size functions for them as quality functions for us. What for us is honour and dishonour, for them is winning and losing. In the world of the future, a world of merchants and mechanics, the base impulses of the mongrel are those that will dominate. The Westerner is the future, Nikko. A grim and impersonal future of technology and automation, it is true – but the future nevertheless."

He (Nicholai) came to recognise that all Americans were merchants, that the core of the American Genius, of the Yankee Spirit, was buying and selling. They vended their democratic ideology like hucksters, supported by the great protection racket of armaments deals and economic pressures. Their wars were monumental exercises in production and supply. Their government was a series of social contracts. Their education was sold as so much per unit hour. Their marriages were emotional deals, the contracts easily broken if one party failed in his debt servicing. Honour for them consisted in fair trading. And they were not, as they thought, a classless society; they were a one-class society – the mercantile. Their elite were the rich; their workers and farmers were best viewed as flawed and failed scramblers up the middle-class monetary ladder. The peasants and proletariat of America had values identical to those of the insurance salesmen and business executives, the only difference being that these values were expressed in more modest fiscal terms: the motor boat rather than the yacht; the bowling league rather than the country club; Atlantic City rather than Monaco.

But it was not their irritating assumption of equality that annoyed Nicholai so much as their cultural confusions. The Americans seemed to confuse standard of living with quality of life, institutionalised mediocrity with equal opportunity, bravery with courage, machismo with manhood, liberty with freedom, wordiness with articulation, fun with pleasure – in short, they had all the misconceptions common to those who assume that justice implies equality for all, rather than equality for equals.

Major: "You deny that he (Kishikawa) was a part of the Japanese military-industrial machine?"
Nicholai: "He was a soldier." The more accurate response would have been that he was a warrior, but that distinction would have meant nothing to these Americans with their mercantile mentalities.

Nicholai recognised the haggling tone of the market place. Like all Americans, this Major was a merchant at heart; everything had a price; and the good man was he who bargained well.

Nicholai: "It's not Americans I find annoying; it's Americanism: a social disease of the post-industrial world that must inevitably infect each of the mercantile nations in turn, and is called 'American' only because your nation is the most advanced case of the malady, much as one speaks of Spanish flu or Japanese encephalitis. Its symptoms are a loss of work ethic, a shrinking of inner resources, and a constant need for external simulation, followed by spiritual decay and moral narcosis. You can recognise the victim by his constant efforts to get in touch with himself, to believe his spiritual feebleness in an interesting psychological warp, to construe his fleeing from responsibility as evidence that he and his life are uniquely open to new experience. In the latter stages, the sufferer is reduced to seeking that most trivial of human activities: fun."

No prizes for guessing which side Trevanian is on!

Agricultural Vs Industrial Society: Martial Vs Commercial Society

In the Agricultural Age, the primary production system was agriculture. The main input for agriculture is land. So whoever controlled land had power. The king controlled land, and hence had power.

Now the king belonged to the warrior class (Kshatriyas). Each class has its own values. The values of the warriors were strength, courage, duty and loyalty. These constituted the warrior ethic.

Since warriors were the dominant class in agricultural society, their ethic – the warrior ethic – was the dominant ethic in society.

Thus, agricultural society was a martial society*. And the Agricultural Age was the Age of the Warrior.

*The French social thinker Auguste Comte (1798–1857) used the term "military society" to describe agricultural society.

After the Industrial Revolution everything changed.

In the Industrial Age, the primary production system is industry. The main input for industry is capital. So whoever controls capital has power. The capitalists control capital, and hence have power.

Now capitalists belong to the merchant class (Vaishyas). Merchants have only one value: wealth/money. This constitutes the merchant ethic.

Since industrialists/businessmen are the dominant class in industrial society, their ethic – the merchant ethic – is the dominant ethic in society.

Thus, industrial society is a commercial society. And the Industrial Age is the Age of the Merchant.

Today there is no victory and defeat; only success and failure. Today there is no honour and dishonour; only profit and loss.

1. Gurcharan Das approves of this change.
2. Watch The Last Samurai (2003) for a beautiful argument in favour of the Age of the Warrior and the warrior ethic.

The West/Europe Vs India, China and the World

Q: How did Britain conquer India? Britain is as big as Karnataka (6 crore people). How did such a small country conquer such a large country as ours?
A: Technology. Britain had superior military technology. It had cannons and muskets, with which it defeated Indian armies – who fought with swords and bows-arrows.

Q: How did Britain get ahead of India in technology? After all, in the ancient age, India was the most advanced civilisation in science.

Britain conquered India in 1757, leading to the Industrial Revolution (1775–1850). The point is: Europe was technologically ahead of other civilisations (like India and China) even before the Industrial Revolution. This helped it to conquer other countries (most importantly, Britain conquered India) which in turn led to the Industrial Revolution. So the real question is –

Q: How did Europe (the West) get ahead of other civilisations – mainly India and China – in technology?
A: Division and competition.

Look at the map of Europe. There is an island: Britain. There are two peninsulas cut off from the mainland by mountain ranges: Spain (by the Pyrenees) and Italy (by the Alps). And the mainland is cut by a river (the Rhine) into two halves: France and Germany. So Europe is geographically divided into several units by rigid barriers.

Now look at the map of India. The land itself is cut off from the rest of the world by major barriers: the Indus, the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean. But look at the internal geography. There are some hill ranges (the Vindhyas, the Ghats). But these are not very tall. There are many rivers (Narmada, Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Kaveri). But these are monsoon-fed, so they are shallow during the summer. Thus India does not have any rigid internal barriers, like Europe does.

Finally, look at the map of China. The real China is only east China. It is just one vast river plain (of the Hwang Ho and the Yangtze). There are no internal barriers at all.

Geography decided history – and therefore everything else (economy, society, politics and culture).

In the ancient age, Europe was ruled by the Roman Empire. This was a temporary aberration. After the Roman Empire collapsed (c500 AD), Europe was divided into its several geographical units. These units then developed as separate – and permanent – kingdoms.

India was also divided into many kingdoms. But there were no rigid barriers that would act as permanent boundaries between these kingdoms – as in Europe. Therefore these kingdoms were not permanent. It was not merely dynasties that rose and fell after one another. The kingdoms themselves (ie, geographical units) appeared and disappeared continuously.

China was the opposite of Europe. Its lack of internal barriers meant it could be unified and ruled as one unit (ie, an empire) for most of its history.

Thus Europe was divided into several permanent kingdoms (which finally became countries). These kingdoms constantly fought wars against one another. To gain military advantage over its enemies, each kingdom encouraged developments in military technology. A technology developed by one kingdom would give it an advantage over the others. But only for some time. The other kingdoms would quickly adopt that technology. And the search would begin for the next technology.

Thus Europe (unintentionally) entered an upward spiral of technological development after 1000 AD. By competing with one another – for the "wrong" reasons, one could say – Europe's kingdoms as a group started pulling ahead of other more advanced civilisations (ie, India and China).

The Europeans mainly advanced in two key areas: weapons and transport. Around 1200 they learned how to make gunpowder (which was invented by the Chinese). Around 1350, the English and the French invented the cannon. Around 1500, the Italians invented the musket. And in ship making, around 1300 the Europeans invented the rudder. Around 1450 they developed the full-rigged ship, with which they could sail long distances.

We see another geographical factor at work here. Europe has a "rough" shape, and hence has a long coastline. India and China have "smooth" shapes, and hence have short coastlines. So Europe relied more on sea transport, while India and China relied more on land transport. Thus Europe focussed on sea transport technology. And the fastest sea vehicle of the Europeans – the sailing ship – turned out to be faster and more efficient that the fastest land vehicle of the Indians and Chinese – the horse.

On the other hand, India (with its temporary kingdoms) and China (with its single empire) did not have this sustained competition and technological development.

Thus by 1500, the West (Europe) had the sailing ship, the cannon and musket. With the sailing ship they could reach other civilisations, and with the cannon and musket they could defeat and conquer them. Thus Britain conquered India. This led to the Industrial Revolution – which took the West still further ahead of India, China and the rest of the world.

"The rise of the West" was the greatest puzzle of history. Eric Jones (The European Miracle, 1981) was the first historian to answer this question. I have not read this book. If you have it, please contact me :-)